Justice in the Auditorium. Gardiner's Theory of Intergenerational Justice by Gianfranco Pellegrino
SYMPOSIUM 
A CHANGING MORAL CLIMATE 
© 2013 – Philosophy and Public Issues (New Series), Vol. 3, No.1 (2013): 69-88 
Luiss University Press 




JUSTICE IN THE AUDITORIUM. 
GARDINER’S THEORY OF 
INTERGENERATIONAL JUSTICE 
 
BY GIANFRANCO PELLEGRINO 
  
[THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK] 
A CHANGING MORAL CLIMATE 
© 2013 – Philosophy and Public Issues (New Series), Vol. 3, No. 1 (2013): 69-88 
Luiss University Press 
E-ISSN 2240-7987 | P-ISSN 1591-0660 
Justice in the Auditorium 









tephen Gardiner’s is destined to be a necessary reading for 
anyone interested in the ethics of climate change.1 
Gardiner filled a gap in climate ethics, and he did this in 
the most insightful way. His main effort was to provide a unified 
account of the ethical problems raised by climate change, 
assuming that by so doing climate ethics could be given a fresh 
(and better) start (xi, 3-4, 61-2). Gardiner’s core assumption is 
that a given description of the problems people face when climate 
change is at stake will suggest a given view of the moral traits of 
the situation. From the description of the difficulties of the 
situation, conclusions about justice descend (4, 22-3, 43).2 The 
book’s central claims are that 
 
1 Stephen M. Gardiner, A Perfect Moral Storm. The Ethical Tragedy of Climate 
Change (New York: Oxford University Press, 2011). Unless otherwise specified, 
parenthetical references are to this text. 
2 Gardiner insists that the perfect storm is also a source of moral corruption (4, 
13, 22-3, 45-8, 298, 301-338). Indeed, he sees unfairness as a core case of 
corruption (304). I shall not focus on this aspect, though, as it is considered in 
S 
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(i) climate change ethics faces three big problems,  
(ii) these problems reinforce each other, and 
(iii) their coexistence and reinforcement worsen the difficulties 
to any ethically-driven solution to climate change (6-8, 22-3, 
47). 
Gardiner drives our attention to the contrast between the 
interests of industrialized and developing nations in the present 
generations and the interests of the poorest nations, of poor 
citizens of developing nations and of future generations. 
Industrialized and developing nations gain in increasing their 
carbon-based consumption (thereby over-emitting), whereas poor 
nations and future generations would gain if the former group 
stopped their consumption (thereby mitigating present and future 
effects of climate change). Gardiner calls the conflict of interests 
between industrialized/developing and poor nations on one side 
and present and future generations on the other respectively the 
global and the intergenerational storms. The final problem he points at 
is the inadequacy of both our current political institutions and 
philosophical theories in dealing with the global and the 
intergenerational storms. This is the theoretical storm (6-7, 27-41, 
108-9, 116-8, 123, 127-8, 213-19, 248). 
Gardiner suggests that, in failing to cooperate, some of the 
participants in the global and the intergenerational storms inflict 
undeserved harms on others (7, 68). From the normative point of 
view, Gardiner attempts to take a neutral stance, on the 
assumption that a plausible view of the moral traits of climate 
change can be given without too many controversial assumptions 
(5, 7 fn. 9, 44, 155-6, 220 fn. 17). However, in his picture of the 
                                                                                                                             
a distinct comment in this issue (cf. Marcello Di Paola, Climate Change and Moral 
Corruption, in this issue). 
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intergenerational storm he relies on a conception of 
intergenerational fairness, as he repeatedly asserts that current 
generations are committing inexcusable and blatant wrongs 
toward future people, harming them in order to gain undue 
benefits (7-8, 143, 150, 158-60, 277). 
In this comment, I shall contend that Gardiner’s description 
of the intergenerational storm does not license his view of 
intergenerational fairness, and that this breaks the unity of the 
picture of climate ethics he provides. I shall claim that the most 
natural conclusion derivable from Gardiner’s description is that 
our duties toward future generations are more lenient than are our 
duties toward people presently affected by climate change. 
Accordingly, if Gardiner’s description of the intergenerational 
storm is right, as I believe it is, then his invocation of 
intergenerational fairness is unsupported. Gardiner’s magisterial 
description of the problem of climate change shows that its 
solution relies not on justice or fairness, but at most on 
beneficence.3 Moreover, the problem of climate ethics is not a 
unified threefold storm, as Gardiner contends. We rather face 
divergent problems, and the theoretical storm is even worse than 
Gardiner admits—as we have also the problem of coping with 
different and not parallel issues. In Gardiner’s hands, climate 
ethics is a serious, and theoretically elegant, issue. I am afraid that 
 
3 I am here assuming a common sense distinction between issues of justice 
understood as questions concerning harms to be avoided and issues of 
beneficence understood as questions concerning goods to be promoted. Of 
course, this dichotomy can be challenged, or further developed in various 
directions. A similar distinction between issues concerning goodness or value 
and issues concerning justice is established in John. Broome, Climate Matters. 
Ethics in a Warming World (New York: Norton & Company, 2012), 12, 13-4. 
Notice that Broome suggests that governmental and collective action are 
aimed at ‘doing the best thing––making the world a better place––’, whereas 
only private morality, i.e. individual action, has justice as its aim (ibid., 13). In a 
sense, I think my conclusions here aligns with Broome’s view. 
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elegance will turn out to lie merely at the surface level, while the 
deep levels of the issue contain only hard problems. 
My comment will proceed as follows. In § I, I will quickly 
reproduce Gardiner’s account of the global and the 
intergenerational storm. In § II, I will give an alternative, but not 
divergent, description of the structure of the intergenerational 
storm. In § III, I shall contend that the intergenerational storm 
does not licence compelling duties of fairness towards future 
generations—indeed, it implies that we have more stringent 
duties toward present victims of climate change. Accordingly, 
Gardiner’s description of the moral problem of climate change 




For Gardiner, the global and the intergenerational storms 
encapsulate a contrast between the dictates of individual and 
collective rationality, a contrast consisting in the mutual 
opposition between the following couples of claims: 
(1) It is collectively rational to cooperate: each agent prefers the outcome 
produced by everyone cooperating over the outcome produced by no one 
cooperating. 
(2) It is individually rational not to cooperate: when each individual has the 
power to decide whether or not she will cooperate, each person (rationally) 
prefers not to cooperate, whatever the others do (26; see also 104-9). 
 
4 Gardiner’s book is immensely rich and detailed. For the sake of space, this 
comment will not focus on many of the topics deserving examination. 
However, I shall attempt to give full references to places where topics that can 
be substantial to my discussion are treated by Gardiner. 
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(1*) It is collectively rational for most generations to cooperate: (almost) every 
generation prefers the outcome produced by everyone cooperating over 
the outcome produced by no one cooperating. 
(2) It is individually rational for all generations not to cooperate: when each 
generation has the power to decide whether or not it will cooperate, each 
generation prefers not to cooperate, whatever the others do (162; see also 
36). 
The consequence of the truth of the above claims is a 
“paradoxical” situation, Gardiner remarks: “each agents [and 
almost each generation] accepts that it is collectively rational to 
cooperate; but […] each agent [and each generation] believes that 
it is individually rational not to cooperate.” The tragedy comes from 
a dominance of individual rationality, which leads to a suboptimal 
outcome and to a failure of collective rationality (27-8, 104, 181). 
The paradox instantiated in the global and the intergenerational 
storms becomes manifest in the sphere of climate change 
mitigation. Even though no country wants climate change, each 
nation prefers not curbing its own emissions and letting other do 
the necessary cuts; accordingly, no one will accept cuts in 
emissions rates. Moreover, the present generation prefers gaining 
from over-emission rather than losing because of cuts on emitting 
activities. Any of the following generations will have the same 
preference. Accordingly, over-emission will be iterated across 
generations (28, 35). 
Gardiner emphasizes differences between the intergenerational 
and the global storms. In intergenerational cooperation, the claim 
about collective rationality (1*) is less general and more unstable 
than the corresponding claim (1) in the global storm. The first 
generation able to over-emit (hereafter the first generation) has no 
incentive to cooperate, because it gains nothing from the 
cooperation of successive generations, nor does it share the costs 
of over-emission, which are passed onto future generations. As a 
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consequence, for the first generation cooperation is pure sacrifice. 
Moreover, if and when the first generation fails to cooperate, this 
fixes the incentives of any subsequent generation (hereafter the 
later generations). Accordingly, Gardiner concludes, “the defection 
of the first generation is enough to unravel the entire scheme of 
cooperation” (37-8), and the buck-passing will be iterated, 
bringing about increased and cumulative effects and worse 
impacts for more distant generations, which will be forced to pay 
compounded costs from the defection of earlier generations (153; 
see also pp. 35-9, 43-45, 47, 123, 148-50, 153-4, 160-64, 201-3, 
266). 
In addition, none of the usual solutions to similar 
intragenerational dilemmas are available in the intergenerational 
case. No reciprocity reasons, provided by wider and iterated 
contexts, are available; and neither are institutional solutions.5 
Accordingly, the dominance of individual reasons to defect is 
even stronger in the intergenerational than it is in the 
intragenerational case (37). In the latter, reasons in favour of 
individual defection are contingent on the present state of 
incentives, which can be changed through institutional or 
interactional solutions. By contrast, in the former individual 
reasons to defect are not contingent, as when it is its turn to 
decide whether to cooperate or not, each generation is not 
subject to any reciprocal retaliation on the side of its predecessors 
(163; see also pp. 37-8, 50 fn. 1, 76, 106 fn. 6, 115-7, 213). 
Gardiner points out that the intragenerational and the 
intergenerational storms produce unfairly distributed losses (118-
 
5 To be true, Gardiner is clear on the fact that even in the global storm, i.e. in 
the intragenerational case, current institutions are unable to do the required 
task. However, it seems that in the intragenerational case better institutions are 
possible, whereas in the intergenerational case institutions are unable to do the 
trick, especially with not overlapping generations (at 28-9, 435). 
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23, 242). For instance, surely in industrialized countries poor 
people have experienced heavier adverse effects from climate 
change-driven extreme climatic events.6 Likewise, poor citizens of 
developing countries suffer more from present impacts of climate 
change. As a consequence, in the global storm a failure of 
rationality leads also to a failure of morality—someone’s failure to 
act rationally is also a cause of harms for others. For the ruling 
elites of industrialized countries, failure to mitigate climate change 
is both a long-term irrational behaviour and a wrong, being a 
cause of serious harms to vulnerable people. Similar 
circumstances obtain in the intergenerational storm, where later 
generations suffer from harms produced by the self-interested 
behaviour of previous generations, thereby progressively lowering 




Gardiner claims that current behaviour in the face of climate 
change is driven by a self-defeating view of practical reasons (56-
7).7 He suggests that failure in seriously cutting greenhouse 
emissions is a failure of rationality, because when everyone fails 
to do so, everyone gets less (27-9). In failing to cut their own 
emissions, even industrialized countries and their ruling elites get 
less, because of the impact that ongoing climate change has even 
on them—as it is confirmed by increases in storms and heat-
 
6 On the connections between climate change and extreme events, see Marten 
K. van Aalst, “The impacts of climate change on the risk of natural disasters,” 
Disasters 30 (2006), 5-18; P.J. Webster, G.J. Holland et al., “Changes in Tropical 
Cyclone Number, Duration, and Intensity in a Warming Environment,” Science 
309 (2005), 1844-46. 
7 On self-defeating views of practical reasons, see Derek Parfit, Reasons and 
Persons (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1984), Part I. 
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waves in many Western countries.8 Moreover, recurrent food 
crises can be evidence that also for developing countries climate 
change’s effects can outweigh the gains of economic 
development9. As a consequence, when everyone fails to cut 
emissions in order to gain from carbon-based activities, everyone 
gets less on the whole, and everyone loses more than the losses 
produced by cutting emissions. 
In the intergenerational case things are different. It is not the 
case that when each generation acts in pursuit of its generation-
indexed interests, each generation gets less. Each generation has 
the possibility to pass on the costs of over-emission to future 
generations, guaranteeing for itself only the gains of 
industrialization. In the intragenerational storm, no one can 
maximize her gain if everyone acts as a maximizer, but everyone 
maximizes if everyone acts as a non-maximizer. Accordingly, in 
the intragenerational interaction maximization is indirectly reachable, 
i.e. it can be reached if everyone avoids its direct pursuit.10 By 
contrast, in the intergenerational storm each generation can 
maximize its gains even when everyone acts as a maximizer. 
However, each generation (except for the first) inherits from its 
 
8 See IPCC, “Summary for Policymakers,” in T.F. Stocker et al., Climate Change 
2013: The Physical Science Basis. Contribution of Working Group I to the Fifth 
Assessment Report of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (New York: 
Cambridge University Press, 2013). However, if national impact is at stake, it is 
not clear which nations will be adversely affected by climate change, and it may 
be the case that specific parts of the world will even gain from climate change. 
This exacerbates the global storm, as Gardiner emphasizes at 29-30. 
9 See Molly E. Brown and Chris C. Funk. “Food Security Unde Climate 
Change,” Science 319 (2008), 580-1, Munir A. Hanjraa and M. Ejaz Qureshib. 
“Global water crisis and future food security in an era of climate change,” Food 
Policy 35 (2010), 365-77. 
10 On indirect theories of rationality and morality, see R.B. Brandt, “Fairness to 
Indirect Theories in Ethics,” in Id. Morality, Utilitarianism, and Rights 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1992), 137-57. 
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predecessor’s substantial losses, which diminish its aggregate well-
being. Nevertheless, for each generation is better to increase its 
emissions as much as possible, as doing otherwise would add to 
the already existing losses inherited from the past. So, for each 
generation cutting emissions would be suboptimal, and the only 
way to maximize is through the highest emission rate. 
Accordingly, each generation’s maximization on the whole 
produces a suboptimal, and decreasing, trend, as each 
generation’s maximum—after the first generation—is inferior to 
its predecessor’s maximum. As the generations go on, each 
generation’s quality of life diminishes, whereas each generation’s 
emissions increase. The overall well-being of generations, then, is 
suboptimal, i.e. it is inferior to the well-being that generations 
would have enjoyed had the first generation cut its consumption. 
However, each of the generations gets the maximum it could have, 
if because there is no way to access a world where its maximum is 




Fig. 1: trends of quality of life and emissions rate across not overlapping 
generations11 
 
11 Notice that in framing Figure 1, and in the following figures, I am assuming: 
i. an arbitrary zero level; ii. that by over-emitting, each of the generations 
Philosophy and Public Issues – A Changing Moral Climate 
 78 
In the intragenerational case two possible worlds are equally 
accessible, i.e. they can both be made actual—in one world no 
one maximizes, and thereby everyone gets the maximum (call this 
the maximal world); in another world, everyone maximizes, and for 
this reason no one gets the maximum (call this the maximizing 
world). Both worlds are equally accessible to everyone, but no one 
knows which of them is actual. They are metaphysically accessible, but 
epistemically inaccessible. Each person thinks in the following way: ‘I 
do not know in which world I am living. Suppose I am in the 
maximizing world. If so, it is better for me to maximize, as there 
is nothing I can do to actualize the maximal world, and by failing 
to maximize I would get less than what is available. Suppose 
instead that I am in the maximal world. If so, it is better for me to 
maximize, thereby getting an extra gain. But as everyone thinks 
this way, the maximizing world is made actual. Obviously, if for 
whatever reasons everyone decides not to maximize, then the 
                                                                                                                             
increases its level of quality of life, as compared to successors, and 
simultaneously decreases it, as compared to predecessors; iii. that sudden, non-
linear, falls of the level of quality of life obtain as the emission rate grows, due 
to the overcoming of various tipping points in the effects of greenhouse gas 
concentration on the whole system of Earth climate. These assumptions are 
grounded on predictions contained in IPCC, “Summary for Policymakers”. On 
tipping points, see pp. 39, 100-1, 112, 186-91, 201-2, 222-3; see also Malcolm 
Gladwell, The Tipping Point. How Little Things Can Make a Big Difference (Boston: 
Little, Brown & Company, 2000), Peter U. Clark, Nicklas G. Pisias, Thomas F. 
Stocker, and Andrew J. Weaver, “The Role of the Termohaline Circulation in 
Abrupt Climate Change,” Nature 415 (2002), 863-9, Michael D. Mastandrea 
and Stephen H. Schneider, “Integrated Assessment of Abrupt Climatic 
Changes,” Climate Policy 1 (2001), 433-49, Mike Hulme, “Abrupt Climate 
Change: Can Society Cope?” Philosophical Transactions: Mathematical, Physical and 
Engineering Sciences 361 (2003), 2001-21, Timothy Lenton et al., “Tipping Points 
at the Earth’s Climate System,” Proceedings of the National Academies of Science 105 
(2008), 1786-93. Assumption ii. above encapsulates the evolving aspects of the 
climate change tragedy (at 110-12). See also pp. 200-3. 
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maximal world becomes actual.12 Accordingly, the maximal world 
is epistemically inaccessible, but not practically so. In any moment, 
it would be possible to make it actual. Hence, the outcome 
produced by everyone maximizing is suboptimal: it is inferior to 
the outcome produced by everyone cooperating. Institutional 
solutions, and other ways to change incentives, are tools able to 
induce people to avoid maximizing conduct, thereby actualizing 
the maximal world. 
In the intragenerational case, the maximal and the maximizing 
worlds are simultaneous. At each point on the time curve, 
everyone can actualize either one of them. In the 
intergenerational case, there might be two worlds, too, and they 
run parallel to those appearing in the intragenerational case. First, 
there is a world where each generation restraints its maximization, 
by cutting its emissions (call this the maximal* world). Second, 
there is a world where the first generation over-emits, and later 
generations continue the trend. In the latter world, the 
compounded losses cumulate across the generations, thereby 
causing a decreasing trend of the quality of life (call this the 
lowering-maximizing world). Here is a representation of the two 
worlds: 
 
12 Of course, if someone decides not to maximize, this is not enough to 
actualize the maximal world. On the structure of this situations, see D. Parfit, 
Reasons and Persons, 59-110, 382-4, 524-5. 
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a b  
Fig. 2: a two-worlds representation of the intergenerational storm13 
 
As generations are placed at successive points in time, each 
generation might have its world fixed by the choices of its 
predecessor. A generation succeeding a generation that actualized 
a maximal* world can either replicate the non-maximizing 
behaviour of its predecessor, or maximize. The first choice would 
make the maximal* world last one more generation. The second 
choice would put an end to the maximal* world and give rise to a 
lowering-maximizing world—indeed, this would be a mixed world, 
 
13 Notice that in Figure 2 various discontinuous fallings and risings of quality 
of life are assumed. In particular, in the lowering-maximizing world quality of 
life can collapse rapidly due to the overcome of tipping points in the dynamics 
of climate change (this is what is posited in the assumption iii. presupposed in 
Figure 1 and stated in fn. 11 above), whereas in the maximal* world avoidance 
of those catastrophic changes in climate can represent substantial, incremental, 
and non-linear improvement of quality of life. In the diagrams, both collapses 
and improvements of quality of life obtain from the fifth generation onwards. 
Moreover, it is assumed that improvements of quality of life will be less drastic, 
and smaller, than collapses. This corresponds to the idea that the worst effects 
of climate change will produce substantial suffering, as compared to the initial 
conditions, whereas avoiding these effects will guarantee security and 
maintenance of levels of well-being only mildly superior to the initial 
conditions. 
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beginning with a not maximizing generation and going on with 
maximizing ones. By contrast, when it succeeds a generation that 
actualized a lowering-maximizing world, a generation cannot 
actualize a maximal* world. Even if this generation decides to 
cuts its emissions, the world in which it lives is already wretched 
by its predecessor’s emissions. The only rational choice, for such 
a generation, is to continue the maximizing behaviour of previous 
generations. Accordingly, mixed worlds can only be worlds 
beginning as maximal* ones and turning into lowering-
maximizing ones. In Figure 2, the second generation in diagram a 
succeeded a maximizing generation, and has no choice but 
continuing to maximize. (By contrast, the second generation in 
diagram b succeeded a not maximizing generation and chose to 
follow that trend, thereby creating a maximal* world). 
Here’s the representation of mixed world: 
 
 
Fig. 3: A mixed world 
For each generation living in a lowering-maximizing world, 
maximal* worlds can be metaphysically inaccessible. While moves 
from maximal* to lowering-maximizing worlds are possible, it is 
impossible to go from a lowering-maximizing world to a 
maximal* one—mixed worlds begin with not maximizing 
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generations (able to create maximal* worlds) and go on with 
maximizing generations (who make actual lowering-maximizing 
worlds). Let’s call this way of framing the intra- and the 
intergenerational storms the two-worlds story. 
Our actual world is a lowering-maximizing one: as many 
previous generations have over-emitted, and have done so despite 
awareness of the harms connected to over-emission, present and 
future generations cannot accede a maximal* world. As a 
consequence, the moral assessment of a lowering-maximizing 




In a lowering-maximizing world, cooperation—i.e. the 
maximal* world—is metaphysically inaccessible. In a lowering-
maximizing world maximization is not a suboptimal strategy—
even though it is a strategy leading to a decreasing maximum. If 
so, whereas in the intragenerational case a failure of rationality 
amounts to a moral fault, in the intergenerational case there is no 
failure of rationality at all. In lowering-maximizing worlds 
rationality and morality diverge. An over-emitting behaviour is 
not irrational, even though it causes unfair harms on later 
generations. Accordingly, unfairness—and moral fault in 
general—are not consequences, or counterparts, of failures in 
practical rationality. In lowering-maximizing worlds, over-
emitting generations cannot be accused of irrationality or self-
contradiction.14 
However, it might be argued that even in a lowering-
maximizing world a rational but harming behaviour is immoral. 
 
14 Gardiner acknowledges this at 162-3.  
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In deciding to actualize a lowering-maximizing world, the first 
generation harms later generations, because in a maximal* world 
later generations would have been better off than they are in a 
lowering-maximizing world. (In Figure 2, diagram b, later 
generations are better off than are later generations in Figure 3.) 
In a lowering-maximizing world later generations are worse-off 
because of a choice made by the first generation. This generation 
could have caused them to be better off. As a consequence, they 
have been harmed by the first generation. By contrast, later 
generations are not causally responsible for the fate of their 
successors—as this fate has been fixed, as it were, by the first 
generation. Accordingly, they are not harming their successors. 
Consider the Auditorium Dilemma: 
If the First Row stands, it will improve its view of the engrossing spectacle 
on stage. If it is worth standing to get this better view, it will be better for 
the First Row if it stands. But this would block the Second Row’s view. 
This Row would need to stand to regain the view that it had when all were 
sitting. Since it would now be standing, but would not have improved its 
view, this outcome would be worse for the Second Row. Similar remarks 
apply to all the other Rows.15 
People in the first row may either stand or sit down. In 
choosing to stand, they harm people in the other rows—because 
those people will have a worse view. What about the second row? 
It may either stand or sit down, too. By choosing to stand, it will 
come back to the initial condition—people in this row will see 
how they would have seen had the first row sat down. The third 
row people can choose to stand as well, in order to restore their 
original condition—i.e. the visibility they would have had had the 
first row sat down. And so on. 
 
15 D. Parfit, Reasons and Persons, 524. 
Philosophy and Public Issues – A Changing Moral Climate 
 84 
It might be argued that as the first row harms the second row 
by choosing to stand, similarly the second row harms the third 
row, and so on. But this cannot be true, because the alternatives 
available to the first row are different ones. The first row can 
choose either to stand or to sit down. If they choose to sit down, 
the view of the other rows is the best available—i.e. it is the best 
in the conditions given.16 When they choose to stand, they 
worsen the view of the other rows—making it less than best, i.e. 
suboptimal. This is not true of the rows from the second one 
 
16 Some particulars need to be settled. The goodness of the view of the rows 
other than the first depends on the shape of the auditorium and the position of 
the stage. If the auditorium is of the amphitheatrical kind—with rows placed at 
different heights and in a circular arrangement –, then it might be supposed 
that when all the other persons sit down each person in eacb row has the same 
quality of vision. If the auditorium is of the ordinary kind, then people in the 
rows other than the first can have a progressively worse view. I shall assume 
that Parfit does not refer to an amphitheatrical auditorium, as in this kind of 
structure even with the first row standing, the view of the other rows will be 
worsened in decreasing degrees—indeed, as the distance from the first row 
increases the view improves. In contrast, in an ordinary theatre the first row 
worsen the view of each of the other rows. To be true, both representations 
can be inaccurate. Climate change has both  continuous effects, effects that can 
be prolonged by inaction of the first generation nut tend to decrease, and 
jumping effects, as it were, effects that affect distant generation once a given 
threshold is overcome, while proximal generations are spared. Neither the 
amphitheatrical auditorium, nor the ordinary one can accurately represent both 
these effects. Here, I shall not consider further this point. Gardiner considers 
these two kinds of effects at pp. 40-1 (at 101 he seems to be skeptical on the 
relevance of tipping points in climate change ethics; however, he qualifies this 
position at 183-203, 224-30). I am assuming that the fact that the first row 
stands creates a harm on the other rows that even though decreasing (if the 
auditorium is amphitheatrical) cannot be cancelled. This amounts to assuming 
that some of the effects of climate change—for instance extinction of certain 
species—will be permanent and irreversible. If this is the case, an ordinary and 
an amphitheatrical auditorium are equivalent, as it were: when continuous 
effects are not at stake, then jumping effects are to be considered, and vice 
versa. This is the reason why in the text I do not consider further this issue. 
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onwards. If people in the second row choose to sit down they 
will have a worse view than they would have by standing. In this 
respect, their condition is similar to the first row people. But if 
the second row audience chooses to stand this does not harm (i.e. 
it does not make worse) the third row’s view, because the third row is 
already seeing worse because of the first row’s choice to stand. The 
first row’s choice worsen the view of each of the other rows, while 
the choices of each of the other rows have no impact on the 
succeeding rows. The harm produced by the first row spreads 
over each of the other rows.17  
Accordingly, each of the rows except the first does not harm 
their successors—at least not in the sense of making them worse 
off. In a sense, each of the rows except the first is metaphysically 
necessitated to not making any difference in the predicament of 
their successors. In the terminology employed in the two-worlds 
story, once the first row decided to stand, the world where each 
of the rows sees at its best is metaphysically inaccessible. It seems 
pointless to ask them to act otherwise—i.e. to sit down—in order 
to produce a better outcome—i.e. in order to give a better view 
to the other rows. For in the worlds accessible to them, no better 
outcome is achievable—once the first row stood, no better view 
 
17 It might be claimed that the first over-emitting generation cause harms 
impacting on distant generations—namely, harms whose bad effects jump 
some near cohorts and impact on distant generations, harms whose bad effects 
are jumping effects (see fn. 16 above). This might depend on tipping points to 
be overcome, and to non-linear effects of climate change (on this, see the 
references in fn. 11 above). I do not see how this might change substantially 
the points made in the main text. The only consequence of this alternative 
view of how harms of over-emission spread is to postpone the very moment 
when a generation is forced to over-emit to cope with its inherited burdens. In 
that moment, the intergenerational dynamics considered in the text obtains—
the first generation harms later generations, which in their turn over-emit to 
recover the inherited losses. 
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is possible for the other rows. The state of affairs where all the 
rows have a better view is metaphysically inaccessible. 
For similar reasons, each of the later generations in a lowering-
maximizing world cannot be demanded to abstain from 
maximization. They could be so demanded if their abstention 
would produce the best outcome. But each of the worlds where 
their abstention would have this result is metaphysically 
inaccessible for them. It might be objected that if any of the later 
generations would abstain from maximization, this would avert 
losses to its successors—even though the successors must still 
incur some of the losses coming as a consequence of the first 
generation’s over-emission. Accordingly, the objection continues, 
each of the later generations may be demanded to abstain from 
maximization, as this would relieve its successors from some 
burdens. 
This objection can be answered. Demanding each of the later 
generations to abstain from maximization for the sake of its 
successors cannot be a request of fairness, but rather a duty of 
beneficence. Fairness is not realized if any of the later generations 
takes on itself losses coming from the first generation and some 
of the losses that its successors would bear as a consequence of 
the first generation’s over-emission. Rather, this would produce 
an uneven and unfair distribution of burdens among generations, 
where substantial sacrifices of earlier generations would be asked 
in order to relieve losses for later generations. This cannot be a 
fair intergenerational distribution of the burdens deriving from 
the first generation’s over-emitting.18 
 
18 Gardiner comes near to acknowledging this point in Stephen M. Gardiner, 
“A Contract on Future Generations,” pp. 110-12, in Intergenerational Justice, ed. 
A. Gosseries and Lukas H. Meyer (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2009), 
77-118. 
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If the two-world story and the auditorium dilemma are reliable 
representations of the structural features of the intergenerational 
storm, then intergenerational fairness cannot be demanded of 
later generations. More precisely, only the first generation able to 
over-emit can be asked to be fair towards the later generations, 
i.e. to abstain from any action leading to harm. But once the first 
generation decided to harm the later ones, whatever its successors 
do is morally permissible—at least in terms of fairness. Since the 
initial generators of climate-change-inducing over-emissions are 
now past generations, Gardiner’s picture of the intergenerational 
storm implies that nobody can be accused of be unfair now, and 
that nobody could be so accused in the future. 
If the above reasoning is sound, it turns out that Gardiner’s 
description of the intergenerational storm has the unintended 
effect of fuelling some skepticism towards intergenerational 
climate ethics. In the intragenerational case, reluctant nations can 
be charged of being collectively irrational (because their 
cooperation would make the overall world better off), as well as 
unfair (because their actual conduct harms developing and poor 
nations). By contrast, in the intergenerational case, later 
generations cannot be charged either of irrationality or of 
unfairness, because they are not guilty of harming their 
successors—at least in the sense that each generation is 
metaphysically unable to produce an outcome where its 
successors are not worse off. Henceforth, it seems that each of 
us—as an individual citizen of a developed or developing 
nation—has more stringent duties towards present victims of 
climate change than towards future generation. Not only the 
structural parallel between the intragenerational and the 
intergenerational storm fades away, but the moral consequences 
of such a parallel also vanish. While the intragenerational storm is 
a firm ground for advocating global fairness in dealing with the 
costs of climate change, the intergenerational storm is better 
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passed unnoticed, as it would legitimize a strong preference for 
the present at the cost of future generations. The 
intergenerational storm can at most ground duties of beneficence 
towards future generations, and these duties—one can assume—
are less stringent than duties of fairness or of corrective justice. 
If so, Gardiner’s overall project appears to be seriously 
weakened. There is no common core for climate ethics. Whereas 
intragenerationally we face a contradiction within practical 
rationality, and this contradiction can ground duties of justice, 
intergenerationally we seem to face the absence of grounds for 
claims of justice in favour of future generations. Possibly, the 
theoretical storm is even deeper than Gardiner allows, because we 
are faced with scattered problems, rather than common issues in 
different fields. But the overall storm is surely less than perfect. 
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